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No. 6221 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE K. THo~rPsox nnd FR--\:XK 
S . .JI .-\ R K H A ::-.r, copartnership 
doing· business under the firn1 
nam~ and st-:le of THO::\IPSON-
.JL-\RKH.DI co:\IP.-\XY. 
Plain tiffs, 
YS. 
THE IxDl"STRL'I.L Co:'.Dnssro~ OF 
UTAH, \Y ILLIAM :JI. l(XERR, 
Chairman and rnember of said 
The Industrial Connnission of 
Utah, and 0. F. 1IcSHA:XE and 
FRAXK A. JrGLER, members of 
said The Industrial Conunis-
sion of Utah, and E. A. HoDGES) 
State ~Ietal :Mine Inspector, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIJE 
Rrcn, Rrcn & STRONG) and 
CARLOS J. BADGER) 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE K. THOMPsox and FRANK 
S. ~I ARK HAM, copartnership 
doing business under the finn 
name and stvle of THOMPSON-
_jb.RKHAM CO:\lPAXY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE IxnesTRIAL CoMMrssrox OF 
UTAH, WILLIAM ~I. KNERR, 
Chairman and member of said 
The Industrial Commissi·on of 
Utah, and 0. F. McSHANE and 
FRANK A. J UGLER, members of 
said The Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, and E. A. HoDGES, 
State ~fetal ~fine Inspector, 
Defendants. / 
No. 62.21 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURl~ 
The undersigned as attorneys for the Associated 
General Contractors petitioned to be allowed to appear 
as amicus curire in the above matter by reason of the 
fact that the principles and questions of law presented 
for determination will vitally affect members of the 
Associated General Contractors in the submitting of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
bids upon and prosecution of projects involving under-
ground excavations unrelated to mining; and by rea:son 
of the further fact that the determination of such ques-
tions .substantially affects the construction industry gen-
erally and the employees thereof who may be called 
, upon, in the prosecution rOf :projects unrelated to mining 
to be engaged in the making of excavations. Permis-
sion having been granted to appear in that capacity, 
counsel will attempt as far as possible to avoid repeating 
the matters and things already presented in t·he briefs of 
plaintiffs and defendants already on file. 
The powers of the Industrial Con1mission are set 
forth in Section 42-1-16 of the Revised Statute's. So 
far as this case is concerned the Commission has juris-
diction and authority to enforce all laws for the pro-
tection o.f the life, health, safety, :protection, and welfare 
of employees. In addition it has jurisdiction to extend, 
fix, prescribe, modify and enforce reasonable orders 
relating to the protection of life, health, safety and wel-
fare of employees. Under the,latter power the statute 
prescribes the pr·ocedure to be followed, namely, investi-
gation, order by the Commission, time and place for 
hearing, etc. It is not contended in the case at bar that 
the Commission is attempting to exercise jurisdiction 
under that authority. Under the provisions of para-
graphs IX and XII of the :petition and IX and XII o.f 
the answer it is alleged and admitted that the attempted 
jurisdiction of defendants arises by reason of the first 
enumerated portion of the statute, namely, to enforce 
this particular law as against petitioner. 
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~\n attempt to enforce a law as against individuals 
not subject to the law is a jurisdictional questi·on such 
as to give right to resort to one of the extraordinary 
remedies sought in this ease. 
See State L\ Padavich decided by the Supreme Court 
of Iowa in 1937, 27-! X. \Y. 51, where the state mine in-
spector atten1pted to enforce certain pr-ovisions of the 
mining code with reference to the protection of em-
ployees against the owner of a n1ine, working therein 
as owner-not employee. 
The only question, therefore, for determination in 
the case is as to whether the provisions of Section 49-3-2 
of the Re,·ised Statutes of Utah 1933, as amended by 
Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1937, apply to employers and 
employees engaged in excavation work unrelated to 
mining, although in s·ome particulars similar in char-
acter. 
Counsel for petitioners assert in their brief that 
this statute is penal in character and should be strictly 
construed. On the other hand, counsel for defendants 
insist that under the provisions ·Of Section 103-1-2 of 
the penal code of our Revised Statutes the 0o·mmon law 
rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has 
no applicability, and that all statutes are to be construed 
according to the ''fair import of their terms''. In 
addition to the authorities cited by counsel for plain-
tiff'·s upon this particular subject matter, we respectfully 
call the court's attention to the fact that in the case of 
Short v. Mining Company, 20 Utah 20, this court ex-
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pressly held the statute in question to he penal in char-
acter. 
Our Section 103-1-2 to ~hich counsel for defendants 
makes reference was taken from and is word for word the 
same as one from California. Section 179, Volume 23 
California Jurisprudence, page 802, states as follows with 
reference to the extent to which this provision of our stat-
ute affects the common law rule of statutory construction: 
''Sec. 17~). Penal Statutes.-At common law 
penal statutes are strictly 0onstrued, and all 
doubts are resolved in favor of the person sought 
to be subjected thereto. But this rule has no 
application to the Penal Code, and it has been 
held that a penal provision, whether contained 
in one of the 0odes or not, should receive such 
construction as will comport with the fair import 
of its terms, with a view to effect their objects and 
to promote justice. Nevertheless, courts are not 
authorized to build up crimes 'with the aid of 
inference, implication and strained interpreta-
tion.' Nor may they impose penalties where the 
law is silent. On the contrary, it is clear that no 
one may be made subject to a penal statute by· 
implication, and that such a statute may not, under 
any rule of construction, be so read as to reach 
further than its wo·rds. If the consequences of a 
penal provision are confined to a specified class 
of cases, other cases not mentioned are excluded; 
and where any particular article of property is 
mentioned as the subject of an offense, only such 
property as is usually designated by such term 
may be regarded as embraced within its provi-
sions.'' 
Numer·ous cases are cited to support this statement. 
Assuming, however, that under the provisions of our 
statute as cited by counsel for defendants, penal statutes 
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are to be construed according to the fair import of their 
terms, we nevertheless respectfully subn1it that statutes 
of this char~cter are not to be extended by judicial 
interpretation beyond the fair import of their terms or 
meaning, and that a consideration of this statute, coupled 
with its legislatiYe and judicial history, shows that the 
"fair import of its tern1s" amply manifests the intention 
of the legislature to confine the statute in applicability 
to mines and smelters. 
Determining the ''fair import'' of a statute simply 
means an effort t·o find out what the legislature intended 
the statute to cover. It is no part of the business of the 
judicial branch and no function of the executive depart-
ment to write new legislation. T·hat function is to be 
exercised exclusiYely by the legislature. 
Counsel for plaintiffs have set forth the legislative 
and judicial hist·ory of this enactment from its earliest 
inception. Counsel for defendants, on the other hand, 
criticize this historical record to the following effect: 
First, that the titles" A DAY'S \YOR.K-MINES AND 
S:\lELTERS '' \Yas not in. the act but was inserted by 
the engrossing clerks or by the printers; and second, 
that the statements used by the Supreme Court of Utah 
and the Supreme Court ·of the United States in the 
cases of State v. Holden and Holden v. Flardy were 
dicta. 
\Ye respectfully submit that counsel for defendants 
are in error in both particulars. 
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STATE V. HOLDEN AND HOLDEN V. HARDY. 
The two Holden cases, 14 Utah 71 and 14 Utah 96, 
were decided i~ October and November, 1896, respect-
ively. The Constitution of our State was adopted N,ov. 
5, 1895 and this law was originally passed in 1896. \Yhile 
the Holden cases, a.s stated by counsel for defendants, 
involved conviction for violation of the Statute by work-
ing a man longer than eight hours in a concentrating 
n1ill and in an underground mine respectively, it is not 
altogether true, as stated by counsel for defendants, 
that "there was no question as to whether the act applied 
to underground work other than miners, and this court, 
in either case, did not mention the subject", as stated 
on page six of their brief. The constitutionality of this 
statute was raised upon the ground that it contravened 
other provisions of the Constitution of Utah and pro-
visions of the Constitution of the United States. It was 
alleged that there were other provisions in the Consti-
tution of the State of Utah and United States guaran-
teeing to individuals the free right to make contracts, 
particularly with reference to one's services; that the 
eight hour provisions of the Constitution related entirely 
to work or undertakings carried on or aided by the state, 
county, or municipal go;vernments; and that the pro-
vision in the Constitution for the legislature to pass laws 
to provide for the healt1h and safety of laborers in fac-
tories, smelters and mines was .a separate and distinct pro-
visio'n from the fir~t portion of the paragraph stating that 
eight hours should constitute a da~· 's \York on public pro-
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jects. It therefore ,,~as a dec:isiYe question in the cases 
whether the eight hour statute was passed under t1he gen-
eral provision to pass laws to provide for the health and 
safety of employees in mines; whether the eight hour 
provision applied to mines because of the fact that min-
ing is vested with a public interest; whether the legis-
lation was passed lmder the general welfare clause; 
whether an eight hour provision was a health or safety 
measure if passed pursuant to the last portion of Section 
6; and if attempted to be passed under the general 
welfare clause whether it would be unconstitutional 
because both the Constitution of the State of Utah and 
the Constitution of the United States expressly limited 
the right .of the state legislature to pass regulatory laws 
upon business not affected with a public interest. 
A reading of the first Holden case shows that all of 
these constitutional questions were propounded and de-
cided. It was therefore necessary for the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah and also for the Supreme Court 
of the United States to determine first and foremost 
the source ·o.f constitutional authority for the enactment. 
That, we respectfully submit, is the reason why those 
courts considered the applicability of the law to other 
industries. The eight hour provision expressly applied 
only to works or undertakings carried on or aided by 
the state, 0ounty, or municipal governments. That was 
a general application-not limited to any activity. The 
general welfare clause is not limited to any particular 
activity excepting that the enterprise regulated or the 
particular ·employees affected must affect the general 
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public. On the other hand the provision of the Consti-
tution that the legislature shall pass laws to provide for 
the health and safety .of employees of factories, smelters 
and mines was limited to that particular class of indus-
tries or activities. If, therefore, the legislation was 
passed pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution to 
provide by legislation for the health and safety of mine 
and smelter emp1oyees, then the legislation was limited 
to and to be interpreted by that intent. 
With this understanding of the questions presented 
for consideration we submit that the decisions involved 
wherein the particular act in question was tied definitely 
and finally to the constitutional power given the legisla-
ture to legislate for the health and safety of emp1o,yees 
in smelters and mines becomes conclusive and binding 
in view of subsequent history, as to the intent of the 
legislature in enacting it. 
That our understanding of the Holden case is cor-
rect is manifest from the statements of the court as to 
the basis f.or its decision. 
In the first Holden case, 14 Utah 71, this court had 
the following to say: 
''The first clause of section 6 declares that 'eight 
hours shall constitute a day's work on all works 
or undertakings carried on or aided by the state, 
county or municipal government.' We presume 
the object of this provision was to protect the 
laboring man fro,m the injurious consequences of 
prolonged physical effort, and to give him the 
remainder of the 24 hours for his own personal 
affairs, and for the cultivation of his mental and 
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moral powers, the acquisition of useful knowledge, 
and for rest and sleep. The second clause of the 
section conunands the legislature to pass laws 
'for the health and safety of employes in fac-
tories, smelters and mines.' This provision must 
be regarded as an expression of the will of the 
people of the state with respect to the subjects 
and objects of legislation named in it; and they 
possessed all the power to enact laws with respect 
to such subjects that the people of the United 
States had not conferred in the national consti-
tution exclusively on that government. Any law 
adapted to the preservation of the health or safety 
.of employes vn. factories, smelters, or mines is 
within the seope of this pr·ovision. The law must 
be connected with some of the objects named, and 
calculated to effect that purpose. If it is not so 
connected and adapted, the court has the right to 
hold that it is not within the scope of the provi-
sion. * * * 
''This brings us to the question: Is the first 
section of the statute limiting the period of em-
ployment of laboring men in underground mines 
to eight hours per day, except in cases of emer-
gency, where life or property is in imminent 
danger, calculated to protect the health of such 
laboring men~ * * * We cannot say that this 
law, limiting the period of labor in underground 
mines to eight hours each day, is not calculated 
to promote health; that it is not adapted to the 
protection of the health of the class of men who 
work in underground mines. 
''While the provision of the oonsti tution 
under consideration makes it the duty of the leg-
islature to enact laws to protect the health and 
to secure the safety of men working in under-
ground mines, and in factories and smelters, it 
does not prohibit the legislature from enacting 
other laws affecting such classes, to promote the 
general welfare. * * * On the other hand, 
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while the state constitution contains some manda-
tory provisions, with others, distinguishing the 
departments of the government, and specifying 
the duties of various officers thereof, it contains 
many limitations upon the state, and is regarded 
in a general sense as a limitation upon the state 
government. * * * The enactment of some 
laws is made mandatory. The enactment of 
others is left to the discretion of the legislature, 
as the public welfare may demand. Among the 
mandatory provisions of the constitution of this 
state is the one under consideration. * * * 
."But some pursuits are attended with peculiar 
hazards and perils, the injurious consequences 
from which may be largely prevented by precau-
ti·onary means, and laws may be passed calculated 
to protect the classes of people engaged in such 
pursuits. It is not necessary to extend the pro-
tection to persons engaged in other pursuits not 
attended with similar dangers. To them the law 
would be inappropriate and idle. So, if wnder-
ground mining is attended wit1h dangers pe·culiar 
to it, laws adapted to the protection of such 
miners from such danger should be confined to 
that class of mining, and should not include other 
employments not subject to them. And if men 
engaged in underground mining are liable to be 
injured in their health, or otherwise, by too many 
hours' labor each day, a law to protect them 
should he aimed at that peculiar wrong. In this 
way, laws are enacted to protect people from 
perils from the operation of railroads, by requir-
ing bells to he rung and whistles sounded at road 
·Crossings, and the slacking of the speed of the 
trains in cities. 8o, the sale of liquor is regulated 
to lessen the evils of the liquor traffic, and other 
classes of business are regulated by appropriate 
laws. In this way, laws are designed and adapted 
to the peculiarities attending each class of bus-
iness. By such laws, different classes. o£ people 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
are protected by Yarious arts and provisions. In 
this way, Yarious classes o.f business are regu-
lated, and the people protected, by appropriate 
laws. fron1 dangers and evils that beset them; 
safety is secured, health preserved, and the hap-
piness and welfare of humanity promoted. All 
persons engaged in business that may be attended 
with peculiar injury to health or otherwise, if not 
regulated and controlled, should be subject to 
the same law; ·otherwise, the law should be 
adapted to the special eircmnstances. T·he pur-
pose of such laws is not adYantage to any person 
or class of .persons, or disadvantage to any per-
son or class of persons. Necessary and just 
protection is the s·ole object. * * * 
''The section of the statute whose constitu-
tionality is involved in this case includes all em-
ployees and employers engaged in working under-
ground mines. None are omitted who may be 
subject to the peculiar conditi·ons that attend such 
mining. The provision of the state constitution 
quoted makes it the duty of the legislature to 
·pass la1cs to provide for the health alf'lrd safety 
of employes i·ll factories, smelters :and mrines.' 
And we are not authorized to hold that the law 
in question is not calculated and adapted in any 
degree to promote the health and safety of per-
sons working in mines and smelters. Were we 
to do so, and declare it void, we would usurp the 
.powers intrusted by the constitution to the law-
making power. The discharge of the petitioner 
is denied, and he is remanded to the custody of 
the sheriff named, until discharged according to 
la\\'." 
and in the second Holden case, 14 Utah 96: 
"The people of the state, in their constitu-
tion, made it mandato·ry upon the legislature to 
'pass laws to provide for the health and safety 
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12 
of the employes in factories, smelters and mines.' 
Const. Utah, Art. 16, sec. 6. \Y e do not feel au-
thorized to hold that the statute quoted was not 
designed, calculate·d, and adapted to promote the 
health of the class of 1nen who labor in smelters 
and other works for the reduction and treatment 
of ores. * * * The law in question is confined 
to the protection of that class of people engaged 
in labor in underground mines, and in smelters 
and otlwr works wherein ores are reduced and 
refi;ned. This law applies only to the classes sub-
jected by their employment to the peculiar con-
ditions and effects attending underground mining 
and work in smelters, and other works for the 
reduction and refining of ores. Therefore, it is 
not necessary to discuss or decide whether the 
legislature can fix the hours of labor in other 
employments.'' 
In the case of Holden v. Hardy in the Supreme 
Oourt of the United States, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. Ed. 780, 
the only question involved was as to whether the enact-
ment in question contravened the Constitution of the 
United States. It was no part of the function of that 
court t·o determine the source of legislative power so far 
as the Constitution of the State of Utah was concerned. 
That question had already been decided by the Supreme 
.Court of the State of Utah as arising from the consti-
tutional mandate· to the legislature to pass laws to pro-
vide f.o-r the health and safety of employees in smelters 
and n1ines. The Supreme Court of the United States 
sustained the constitutionality of the law upon the broad 
ground that the State legislature by its enactment bad 
·:decreed that laborers engaged in working in under-
,' :ground mines were entitled to special protection on 
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account of the extra·o·rdinary hazards involved in that 
occupation. In determining its constitutionality upon 
that ground the court said as follows: 
"\Vbile the business of mining coal and man-
ufacturing iron began in Pennsylvania as early 
as 1716, and in \ Tirginia, North Carolina, and 
:Jiassachusetts even earlier than this, both mining 
and rnanufacturing "-ere carried on in such a 
limited \Yay and by such primitive methods that 
no special laws were considered necessary, prior 
to the adoption of the Constitution, for the pro-
tection of the operatives, but, in the vast propor-
tions which these industries have since assumed, 
it has been found that they can no longer be car-
ried on with due regard to the safety and health 
of those engaged in then1, without special protec-
tion against the dangers necessarily incident to 
these employn1ents. I'll consequence of this, laws 
have been enacted in most of the states designed 
to meet these exigencies and to ·secure the safety 
of persons perculiarly exposed to these dangers. 
\\'ithin this general category are .ordinances pro-
viding for fire escapes for hotels, theatres, fac-
tories, and other large buildings, a municipal in-
spection of boilers, and appliances designed to 
secure passengers upon railways and steamboats 
against dangers necessarily incident to these 
methods of transportation. In states where man-
ufacturing is carried on to a large extent, pro-
vision is made for the .protection of dangerous 
machinery against accidental co:q.tact, for ·the 
cleanliness and ventilation of working rooms, for 
the guarding of well holes, stairways, elevator 
shafts, and for the employment of sanitary appli-
ances. In others, where mining is the principal 
industry, special provision is made for the shor-
ing up of dangerous walls, f()r ventilation shafts, 
bore holes, escapement shafts, ·means of signaling 
the surface, for the supply of fresh air and the 
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14 
elimination, as far as possible, of dangerous 
gases, for safe means of hoisting and lowering 
cages, for a limitation upon the nu1nber of per-
sons permitted to enter a cage, that cages shall 
ibe covered, and that there shall be fences and 
gates around the top of shafts, besides other 
similar precautions. * * * 
''Upon the princip1es above ~tated, we think 
the act in question may be sustained as a valid 
exercise of the police power of the state. The 
enactment does not profess to limit the hours of 
all workmen, but merely those who are employed 
in wndergro'Uind mines, or in the smelting, reduc-
tion, or refining of ores or metals. * * * 
''The law in question is confined to the protection 
of that class of people engaged in labor in under-
grownd mines, and in smelters and other works 
wherein ores are reduced and refined. The law 
applies only to the classes subjected by their em-
ployment to the peculiar conditions and effects 
attending wndergrou.nd mining and work in smelt-
ers, and .other works for the reduction and refin-
ing of ores. Therefore, it is not necessary to 
discuss or decide whether the legislature can fix 
the hours of labor in other employments. * * * 
"We have no disposition to criticize the many 
authorities which hold that state statutes restrict-
ing the hours of labor are unconstitutional. In-
deed, we are not called upon to express an opinion 
upon this subject. It is sufficient to say of them 
that they have no application to cases where the 
legislature had adjudged that a limitation is 
necessary for the preservation of the health of 
employees, and there are reas·onable grounds for 
believing that sueh determination is supported by 
the facts. The question in each case is whether 
the legislature has adopted the statute in exercise 
of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action 
be a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination, 
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or the oppression, or spoliation of a particular 
class.'' 
Thus we see that in all three of these cases the 
scope, purview and applicability of the statute was 
necessarily involved in determining its constitutionality. 
The fact that it was limited in scope to employees en-
gaged in the mining industry made it constitutional so 
far as the State -of Utah was concerned because it was 
within the express provisions of a mandate in the con-
siitution to enact laws for the safety and health of men 
engaged in the mining industry. The fact that it was 
limited in scope to employees in the mining industry 
made it constitutional so far as the Constitution of the 
United States was 0oncerned, because the legislature 
declared persons engaged in laboring in underground 
mines to be subject to peculiar hazards incident to that 
employment. The case of Holden v. Hardy was decided 
February 28, 1898. 
This law as passed by the legislature of Utah im-
mediately following adoption of the Constitution and 
was known as Chapter 72 and was entitled, "An .Act 
Regulating the Hours of Employment in Undergrownd 
Mines and in Smelters and/ or Reduction W arks." 
It was re-enacted as part of the Revised Statutes 
of Utah 1898 in consolidated form but with the same 
wording and under the heading "Labor", "In Mines and 
Smelters", and has been carried under that heading with 
the same wording to the present time, excepting that in 
1937 the collar to- collar feature was inserted. 
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The legislature of 1933 in adopting and authorizing 
the Revised Statutes of Utah 1933 reviewed all past 
legislative enactments, revised them and authorized their 
publication as a volume to be known as the Revised 
Statutes ·of Utah 19133, and as a part of that procedure 
passed Ohapter 76 of the Laws of Utah 1933, as follows: 
''The statute book containing the text of the 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, certified to the 
secretary of state by the president of the senate 
and the speaker of the house of representatives 
by authority and direction .of this session of the 
legislature is approved, adopted and legalized as 
to arrangement of said text by title, chapter, 
article and section for the purpose of amendment 
or repeal of said text in whole or in part by ref-
erence thereto.'' 
See also Chapters 74 and 75. Within that statute 
book so adopted and legalized by the legislature of 1933 
was the heading ''In Mines and Smelters'', as a portion 
of the caption for Section 49-3-2, the provision in ques-
tion. We respectfully submit, therefore, that the legis-
lature in 1933 not only adopted the exact wording of 
the law which had already been construed by the 
Supreme Oourt of this State and the Supreme Court 
of the United States, but also officially adopted and 
made a part of the statutes of this State the heading 
''In Mines and Smelters'' as defining, construing and 
limiting the applicability of this statute. 
In 1896 when this statute was first passed H con-
tained three sections. Section 1 contained the same 
wording as that embodied in the present statute, but 
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there was a separate section 2 pertaining to employees 
in smelters and other institutions for the reduction or 
refining of ores or Inetals. In 1898 this statute was re-
enaeted by the legislature of Utah with the same wording 
so far as applies to this case, but wherein the various 
sedions were consolidated into the present statute. This 
re-enachuent by adoption of the same language was after 
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in the various Holden cases 
had decreed the statute to be limited to employees in the 
mining and smelting industry in determining its con-
stitutionality. 
\\1lere statutes are re-enacted, as was done by the 
legislature of Utah in 1898, and was undoubtedly done 
in 1907 and 1917 in adopting and legalizing the Compiled 
Laws {)f those years, with their headings, and as was 
actually done in 1933 by adopting the Revised Statutes 
of Utah 1933, including its title, we respectfully submit 
that the legislature is presumed to have adopted the 
interpretation given it by the courts. 
See the following: 
/)'tate u. Roberts, 56 Utah 136, 190 Pac. 351, 
cited with approval in Tintic Standard 
Jlining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 
491, 13 Pac. (2d) 633, 637; 
Latimer v. U. 8., 
223 U. S. 501, 56 L. Ed. 326, 
where the court said : 
''The words having received such a construc-
tion under the act of 1883, must be given the same 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
meaning when used in the tariff act of 1897, on 
the theory that, in using the phrase in the later 
statute, Congress adopted the construction al-
ready given it by this court." 
And hundreds of cases collected in America•n Digest 
under ''Statutes,'' Key No. 22·53;4, and also 
State v. Chea.lander, et al., 131 Wash. 145, 229 Pac. 
309, holding that where a legislature meets after a 
statute has been construed by the court without taking 
any steps to amend the statute that it will he presumed 
that the legislature has acquiesced in the construction 
of the statute made by the court. 
We also respectfully submit that if there were any 
ambiguity ·Or uncertainty as to the meaning of this 
statute that this court is justified in looking to the head-
ing of the statute and t·he source of constitutional power 
from which it sprang in determining the meaning and 
intent of the statute, and the intent of the legislature 
as to the particular class of individuals to be affected 
by it, in arriving at the ''fair import'' ·of the terms 
used by the legislature. 
J( at.z 1.-.. U. S., 271 U. S. 354, 70 L. Ed. 986; 
Goodcell v. Grahan~, 35 Fed. (2d) 586; 
Southlands Co. v. City of San Diego, 
211 Cal. 646, 297 Pac. 521; 
.:..llcNamara v. State, 
203 Ind. 596, 181 N. E. 512; 
Siegel v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 
201 Iowa 712, 208 X. W. 78; 
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Jrheelright, ct al. r. Refray, 
~~-35 ~lass .. )8-l-. 1~7 ~- E. 5~:3; 
State v. Vo'lcels, 4 Ore. 324: 
Olson u. Erickson, 
56 X. D. 468, 217 ~- \r. 841. 
The word "working" as u.sed in the· statute in ques-
tion when used in connection with mining is a synonym 
for the underground portion of a mine. According to 
lexicographers it may have a n1eaning beyond mining, 
but it has acquired a peculiar significance and applic-
ability to mining. Among mining men and in mining 
communities the word "working" ·D-r "workings'' refer·s 
to the portion of the mine where mining or excavating 
is done as distinguished from the dump, buildings and 
operations on the surface. It is a word of common usage 
and is well understood. 
A Glossary of ~lining and Milling Industry by 
Albert H. Fay is contained in Bulletin No. 95 of the 
Enited States Bureau of :Mines. In it the word "work-
ing" is defined as a. shaft, quarry, level, open cut or 
stope, and as ''a name given to the whole strata exca-
vated in working a seam". The word "workings" is 
defined as ''any species of development; usually refers 
to the breasts in contradistinction to all underground 
excavations''. 
"\Vhile, as before stated, technically speaking, the 
word might have broader application as referring to any 
place in which work is being carried on, we submit that 
in this statute, enacted for the protection and safeguard 
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of the health of employees in mines, it was used as a 
nlining term and as a simile for underground mining. 
In the case of McLaughlin v. Bardsen, (:Jiont.) 145 
Pac. 954, a woman fell into a sewer trench being exca-
vated within the city of Butte. There was a state statute 
with reference to protecting "sinks'', "shafts'' or any 
''drift'' or ''cut'' within the limits of any city or town 
or village of the state. The particular statute in ques-
tion was a part .of the statute under the heading "Mines 
and Prospectors''. It was contended that the statute 
had applicability to sewer trenches because a sewer 
trench was a "cut". In refusing applicability of the 
statute to the case the Montana Supreme Court used the 
following language: 
"This statute was first enacted in 1871 (Codi-
fied Stat. 1871, p. 593), and "·ith very slight 
amendments has been brought forward to the 
present time. The arrangement and classification 
of statutes, their title and headnotes, are all 
proper and available means from which to de-
termine legislative intent. 
* * * * * * * * 
''In every one of the acts above mentioned, 
the only things prohibited are sinking a shaft or 
running a drift or cut. \\Then the statute was 
first enacted, each of these tenns had, and ever 
since has had, a well-defined and generall~· under-
stood meaning. Each referred to an ;operatio·n 
in mining, and to nothing else; at all times 
each has been a strictly mining term. In its br·oad 
significance, the word 'cut' 1nay have a meaning 
other than that employed in mining; but when 
used in conjunction "·ith 'shaft' and 'drift' it 
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1ueans a surface opening in the ground intersect-
ing- a Yein. · Copulatio Yerborum indicat accepta-
tionein in eodem sensu.' Our conclusion, from 
the history of secti·on 8535 and the prohibitive 
languag-e employed, is that it was never intended 
to apply to a ditch or trench ten1porarily opened 
for the purpose of laying sewer pipe.'' 
There \Yas also a Butte city ordinance involved 
which was even broa·der t1han the state statute because it 
included also the phrase "or other excavation". Plain-
tiff also relied upon a violation of that ordinance as a 
ground of liability, but the Supreme Court of Montana 
refused to permit the ordinance to ·be so construed, and 
said as follows: 
"It is very clear that the sewer trench in 
question cannot be classified as a 'shaft,' 'drift,' 
or 'prospect hole.' Each of those terms has a 
well-defined and generally understood meaning 
in this state, and particularly in Butte, where 
mining is the principal industry. But it is in-
sisted that the terms 'or other excavation' are 
sufficiently broad to include the trench in question. 
If the prohibition of the ordinance was directed 
against any excavation being left unguarded, ap-
pellant's contention would prevail. But since 
t1he words ·or other excavation' follow immedi-
ately after the specific enumeration 'shafts,' 
'drifts,' 'prospect holes,' the rule of statutory 
construction exemplified by the expression 
'ejusden1 generis,' or 'noscitur a so cis,' requires 
the word 'excavation' to be employed to mean 
some other opening in the ground of the same 
class of shafts, drifts, and prospect holes. As 
applied to the ordinance in question, the rule 
requires the conclusion that it was the intenti·on 
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of the city council of Butte to use the terms 'other 
excavation' as meaning, and to refer to, some 
other excavation made in the course of prospect-
ing or active mining.'' 
So in the case at bar the word "working" might be 
lifted from its setting and be given broader applicability 
than was given it in the Holden cases, but we respect-
fully submit that when considered in connection with its 
0onstitutional, legislative, statutory and judicial history, 
and when considered as a part of a statute enacted to 
provide for the health and safety of miners, it should 
be construed .as a simile of underground mining, as 
was intended. 
This statute ,,·as conceived in the constitution of 
our state with a mandate to the legislature to enact 
laws f.or the protection, safety, and health of miners. 
It was born in 1896 in an act entitled "An Act Regulat-
ing the Hours of Employment in Underground Mines 
and in Smelters and Ore Reduction Works.'' For forty-
four years, through various revisions, codifications, re-
enactments ~and compilations it has gone under the name 
''Hours of Labor-Mines and Smelters". It is insep-
arably connected with the mining industry, and during 
those forty-four years it never sought applicability out-
side of or beyond that industry. In 1937, however, it 
received attention fr.onl the legislatun~, not to change its 
characteristics but to shorten the hours of employment 
in that industry. This collar to collar attachment 
changed no part of the costume nor character of the 
statute but permitted the miner to go from and return 
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have thought that this collar to collar amendment could 
so change the old statute as to oo·mpletely wipe away the 
forty-four years history and, like a quick-change artist, 
turn the miner into ·a general contractor 1 When we look 
at the situation we find that the attempted change is 
not made by the constitutio~al mother nor the legisla-
tive father, both of whom established its characteristics 
and accepted its limitations as established in the Holden 
cases ·and as classified in all legislative codes, compila-
tions and headings. The executive branch of the Govern-
ment is the one which would sweep aside this legislative 
and judicial ·history and extend the statute to activities 
unrelated to mining. 
But, say counsel for defendants, the operations in 
digging a tunnel such as plaintiffs are constructing are 
similar to mining and the statute should be held as apply-
ing to all operations similar to mining. On page 14 of 
their brief they state, ''this court will take judicial 
notice that we have in this state numerous long tunnels 
which were driven f.or purposes other than mining, 
namely, the Ontario drain tunnel, the Snake Creek drain 
tunnel, Tin tic drain tunnel, and the Elton Tunnel". They 
also state that "prospects" are not mines because they 
may not encounter ore in paying quantities. They argue 
at length that in these other operations miners are used, 
the air is damp and polluted with powder smoke and 
other gases, the miners contract consumption or silicosis, 
and that it makes no difference whether the tunnel is 
being driven for the purpose of finding ore or for the 
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purpose of conveying water. Counsel state that when 
the legislature used the words "or underground works" 
that it intended to cover all of these operations similar 
to mining. Of course the legislature used no such lan-
guage. The wording is ''all underground mines or 
workings'', not ''or undergr.ound works''. 
It is true that in some respects these operations are 
similar. Counsel are in error when they assume that a 
"prospect" is not a mine, because the authorities are 
replete with cases to the effect that they are. When 
individuals burrow in the earth's surface for the purpose 
of either searching for or removing minerals, they are 
engaged in mining, and the "working" or "workings" 
where they ·operate is a mine. United States patents 
are obtained as mineral ground upon showing of the 
existence of a vein, fissure, or lode, without regard to· its 
commercial character. A tunnel used in connection with 
a mine is part of a mine where it is used for transpor-
tation purposes or for drainage purposes. This court 
in the case of Ontario Silver Mining Company v. Hixon, 
49 Utah 359, 164 P.ac. 49-8, decided that the Ontario Drain 
Tunnel, although used for drainage purposes only, was 
an inseparable part of the mine for taxation purposes 
because said tunnel '''as used in furtherance of a mining 
purpose. The drainage was merely incidental to the 
mining. The main purpose of the tunnel was to aid in 
the discovery and removal ·Of minerals. 
Counsel for defendants have mentioned only a few 
of the "underground works" in the State of Utah which 
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have •been and are sin1ilar to mining. In the early his-
tory of the State, and even today, a great many people 
lived in dugouts. In the search for ·water they have bur-
r·owed into the mountains to develop it. In its trans-
portation they have excavated to make it available to 
more fertile land and haYe excavated in the earth's sur-
face to construct reservoirs for its preservation. In our 
rugged country in the construction of railroads, high-
ways, canals, and conduits they have made cuts, tunnels, 
underpasses and .other excavations. In the construction 
of buildings, houses, factories and shops foundations 
have been laid sometime as deep as the height of the 
structure. \Yells have been dug, sewers laid, and drain-
age systems constructed for the purpose of obtaining, 
controlling ·and disposing of water. In 0ongested areas 
practically all telephone, telegraph and other 0ables for 
public utility service is handled by underground tun-
nelling and excavations. Last, and finally, an under-
ground excavation about eight feet by five and approxi-
mately eight feet deep is made as the final resting abode 
of the excavator. Some ·Of these underground structures 
are large, some small, some long, some short, some in 
hard rock where blasting and powder are necessary, and 
in others it may be removed with pick and ·shovel. They 
vary as greatly in character ·and purpose ·as the bills that 
a certain collection agency used to· try to collect. Some 
are long enough to require ventilation; others so short 
that the daylight may enter whenever the sun shines. 
Each and all of these activities comprehend within them 
some of the features of mining-some more, some less. 
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In each and ·all .of them, however, there was the great 
distinguishing feature, namely, the purpose was not to 
search for or extract minerals. This is a great differ-
ence because mining is an industry and, as stated by the 
Missouri Supreme Court in State v. K entwell, 78 S. \V. 
596, 
''The operation of mines is a permanent business, 
lasting frequently for many years. On the other 
·hand the digging of a well or the running of a 
tunnel is not to be classed as a business. It is 
work that is to be completed in a comparatively 
short time. Hence, there was absolutely no rea-
son or necessity for including in the act those who 
might in the construction of railroad or other 
works incidentally be required to work beneath 
the surface .of the earth.'' 
It seems to us that this argument IS amply an-
swered by the cases cited by counsel for petitioners in 
their brief. 
Similarity of operations or similarity of conditions 
has never been a ground for extending a statute beyond 
its "fair import". 
If this court were to announce as a new and novel 
rule for statutory interpretations that statutes might 
by implication be extended beyond their purview to sub-
jects of similar kind or character, untold co•nfusion, un-
certainty, injustice and damage would result. Railroad 
laws would apply to automobiles, street ears and busses. 
Labor laws would apply to capitalists, industrialists and 
'' economi.c royalists''. The wife and housekeeper would 
be subject to all the manufacturing, restaurant, hotel, 
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boarding house and n1otor park laws, and might even 
on accasion be subject to laws affecting public institu-
tions. :Jlen and women who act childish would he sub-
ject to the disabilities of miners. The imagination, if 
giYen to free play, becomes bewildered at the possi-
bilities. In son1e cases the difference ,of character is 
great 'but the similarity of oper·ation identical, and in 
other cases it is the opposite. \Y e submit that certainty 
in matters of statutory law is far greater to be desired 
than the evil \Yhich would result from announcing such 
a rule for interpretation of statutes, the result and effect 
of which would be to open a flood gate of confusion. In 
this connection we call the court's attention to the ease 
of Gardner Baking Company v. Public Service Comm.is-
siou, (\Vis. 1937) 271 N. W. 833, wherein the Supreme 
Court of that state refused to apply the provisions of 
the Moto·r Vehicle Transportation Act fixing hours of 
service for drivers of common carriers and contract car-
riers to drivers ;of private motor carriers. ·There, as 
here, the contention was made that so far as the drivers 
are concerned the ·situation was the same, but the court 
said in effect, "if the legislature had so intended it would 
have said so". 
In this connection counsel for defendants make the 
following argument on page six of their brief: 
"Kumerous tunnels have been driven in the 
mountains for purposes other than mining~ and 
yet the question is raised in this c1ourt f.or the 
first time. It i~s reasonable to suppose that the 
persons who made these tunnels felt that the~.-
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were amenable to the eight hour law and complied 
with the san1e, otherwise it would seem that the 
matter, long ago, would have been broug·ht be-
f,oTe the courts.'' 
Not s1o. The ·only f.air inferenee is that if, during the 
past forty-four years, the exeeutive branch of the gov-
·ernment had attempted to apply this law to cases other 
than mining, there would have been numerous cases be-
fore the court. The ·Only real inference is that when the 
Holden case·s were decided interpreting the law as ap-
plying ·only t~o· those engaged in mi'ning that everyone 
regarded that question as settled. No one should be 
m·ore aware of the fact that the inference suggested by 
counsel for defendants is not true than the defendant 
State Metal Mine Inspector. 
In this conne-ction there is a line of authorities to· the 
effect that when an executive branch of the government 
interprets the .statute or aceepts an interpretation of a 
statute for a long period of time in a certain way that 
that conduct itself may be taken into C!Onsideration in 
construing the statute. 
At page 12 of defendants' brief 1s the following 
statement: 
"vVe are ·only concerned in this matter as to 
whether or not it applies to the tunnel in question, 
but we feel tha.t it is no more applicable to tl1~ 
excavation for a house, or open sezcer, or am ord1-
na.ry well, any more than it would apply to an 
open-cut in a quarry, or the large open-cuts being 
made by the tlta.h Copper Compa;ny." (Italics 
ours). 
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We are at a loss to understand this statement unless it 
means that an e:xcaYation for a house ·or ·open ,sewer or an 
ordinary well are in the sanw class with reference to 
this statute as an open cut quarry and the large Utah 
Copper Company mine. The statement is ambiguous as 
to whether it is counsel's contention that all are subject 
to the statute or that they are not. 
No matter what the intention of oounsel for de-
fendant was, we submit that the reason why the under-
signed as amicus ·Curiae have petitioned to he heard in 
this case is because they are not, under the law, to be 
pla!Ced in the same category .as either a quarry, the open 
pit mine of Utah Copper Company, or the underground 
mines of this state. We respectfully submit that the fair 
import of the· statute in question does not place the con-
struction industry in that category. The Utah Copper 
Company and quarries may or may not be subject to the 
law, but when counsel·sugge,sts that the builder of a house 
or the digger of a sewer or of an ordinary well i's in the 
same class with the Utah Copper Company in its open 
pit operations they are in error. We are not represent-
ing the Copper Oompany. In the case of Byron v. Utah 
Copper Company, 53 Utah 1'51, 178 Pac. 53, this court 
held that the term "mining operations'' included the 
open pit operations of the Utah Copper Company the 
same as underground workings, and in the recent case of 
Utah Copper Compa;ny v. Hays Estate, 83 Utah 545, 31 
Pac. ( 2d) 624, this court held that the waste dump of the 
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Utah Copper Company was ''a place for the reduction 
or refining of ores or metals''. 
Whether Utah Copper Company operations are 
within the law is not in this 1c.ase. In view 10f the fore-
going decisions certainly a ·substantial portion of their 
operations are, but when counsel :states that ail excavat-
ing work is in the same class the only fair inference is 
that they are contending that all such operations are 
within the purview of the law. According to that con-
struction the only thing that is neces·Bary to come within 
t1he .statute is that a laborer be employed to dig any hole 
in the ground for any purpose. 
Non-mining operations in the excavati,on of sewers, 
tunnels, wells, cuts, underpasses, foundations, conduits, 
etc., are .and always have !been part of the operations of 
the ·construction industry. Whether miners are employed 
to perform a portion .of the work depends very largely 
upon the extent and character of the operation. Some-
times blasting is done and ·sometimes not. As a general 
rule ·such employment, if any, is temporary in character 
to meet a particular situation. There are no stopes, 
drifts, etc., as in a mine and, as before stated, if because 
of similarity the Industrial Commis·sion feels that per-
sons employed in those operations are liable to contract 
pneumonia, miner's ·Cionsumption, silicosis, or any other 
of the conditions enumerated by counsel for defendants, 
or if there i~s any other condition which may be danger-
ous or injurious to the health of the l·aborers employed, 
the Industrial Commission has ample power to so declare 
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and specify the remedy, under the ·other pr-ovisions -of 
the statute. 
If the legislative branch of the g"O·vernment feels 
that the present la\Y should be an1ended so as to broaden 
its ·scope, that is t~he privilege of that branch of the gov-
ernment. \Ye may assume, however, that if and when 
it doe·s so the enactment will cover ·only such porti!ons of 
the construction industry as the legislature feels ~should 
be covered. Tthey may desire to include only excavations 
of a certain length or character. Or, again, they may feel 
that such legislation ·should be limited to excavations 
where blasting is done. Those are considerations for 
the legislative branch .of the government. If and when 
this law is extended beyond its present ~scope we may 
assume that the representatives of the people in enaeting 
tthe law will write the ·statute as they de~sire it. It is 
no part -of the functions 10.f the executive branch of the 
government or of the judicial branch to assume to ex-
ercise that function. 
In the recent case of Nuttal v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Railroad Comparny, 99 Pac. (2d) 15, this court was asked 
to write a new rule .of law upon the doctrine of contri-
butory negligence as a'Pplied to railroads. It was con-
tended that the old rule is harsh, out-moded, and not 
adapted to present day conditions. This court answered 
that contention in the :Bollowing language: 
''Finally, it is c-ontended that the rule of con-
tributory negligence is harsh and .should now be 
re~stricted and not be permitted to be interposed 
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at all in negligence actions by way l()f defense to 
any charged violation of express statutory en-
·actment. Tthe answer to this contention lies in 
the fact that during the many years the pre·sent 
rule has been ·enforced in this jurisdiction no 
serious effort has been made to modify same in 
the legislature.'' 
We respectfully submit that the same answer should 
be given to defendants in this .case. If they desire a 
change in the law the legi.slature is the place to seek it. 
In conclusio·n may we state that the cases cited by 
petitioners from Nevada, California, Missouri, Wyoming, 
Colorado and the Federal District Court of Nevada con-
struing statutes similar to this as not applying to con-
struction work other than mining, are in line with our 
own decisions in the Holden ·cases. Not one case is cited 
by counsel for defendants to the contrary. In the face 
of such uniformity of judicial .construction over such a 
long period of time from. so many different jurisdictions, 
it is difficult tn see 1h0\\' there could be any question as 
to the meaning of the statute. 
Respectfully ·submitted, 
RicH, RICH & STRONG, and 
CARLOS J. BADGER, 
Amicus Curiae. 
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